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JPRS L/9835

9 July 1981

# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 730



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## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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### CONTENTS

#### INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

- Region Would View Favorably Ethiopia-Somalia Accommodation  
(Jacques Gautrand; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 10 Jun 81) ..... 1

#### BENIN

- Imbalanced, Flourishing Economies Coexist, Foreign Aid Needed  
(Jacques Latremoliere; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,  
1 May 81) ..... 3

#### GUINEA

- Ups, Downs of Past Toure, Mitterrand Relations Surveyed  
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 17 Jun 81) ..... 12

#### GUINEA-BISSAU

- November Coup Reportedly Has Not Lessened Problems  
(Colm Foy; NEW AFRICAN, Jun 81) ..... 15

#### MALI

- Fresh Party Purges May Be in Offing  
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 27 May 81)..... 16

#### MOZAMBIQUE

- Machel Sends Personal Envoy to Mitterrand Government  
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 9-21 Jun 81) ..... 19
- Increasing Assistance From Zimbabwe in Anti-MNR Fight  
(NEW AFRICAN, Jun 81) ..... 20
- Defense's Guebuza Meets With UK Officials  
(Victoria Brittain; THE GUARDIAN, 25 Jun 81) ..... 22

- a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]

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REUNION

Economic Cooperation With Mauritius (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Jun 81) .....	24
Upcoming Port Improvements to Possession Bay (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Jun 81) .....	26

SENEGAL

Briefs	
Italian Aid Projects	28
Chinese Cultural Agreement	28
Brazil Offers Credit	28

ZAMBIA

Briefs	
Austria Provides Aid	29
World Bank Loan	29

- b -

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

REGION WOULD VIEW FAVORABLY ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA ACCOMMODATION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 10 Jun 81 pp 34-35

[Article by Jacque Gautrand: "The Virtues of Lassitude"]

[Excerpts] Will it be possible to break the impasse in the Horn of Africa? Following the good-will mission of President Hassan Gouled of Djibouti in March and April 1981 to his counterparts in the region, there are some scattered signs of evolution. These diplomatic efforts, joined by the OAU, are aimed at convincing Somalia to "negotiate" with Ethiopia in order to find a solution acceptable to all.

On the occasion of a ministerial conference of the OAU in Addis Ababa in February, attended by the Somali number two man, Mohamed Said Samantar, a discreet attempt at reconciliation had not proved successful.

Since that time, however, the various protagonists are proclaiming their wish to achieve "a durable peace in the Horn."

Invitation

Thanks to its military successes--in the Ogaden--and its diplomatic successes--having "isolated" Somalia within the region--Ethiopia seems to be today in a preponderant position. This would explain the "advances" made to Mogadishu: on 30 April, at the end of a tripartite meeting in Addis Ababa of the Ethiopian, Kenyan and Sudanese ministers of foreign affairs, the head of Ethiopian diplomacy implicitly invited Somalia to participate in the common effort. The invitation was reiterated more openly by the Ethiopian official press agency on 4 May.

As for Somalia, which has been attempting for the past few months to break its diplomatic isolation, notably by sending emissaries to Europe, it is declaring itself "favorable to a dialogue."

However, the conditions imposed so far by Addis Ababa and Mogadishu inevitably lead to a dialogue of the deaf: Ethiopia insists on respect for the principles of "territorial integrity and non-interference." It thus asks Mogadishu to renounce any claims on neighboring territories, or, in other words, to abandon its dream of forming again "Greater Somalia." In turn, Somalia reaffirms its "pledge in favor of the self-determination" of peoples.

At present, the situation does not seem to be ripe enough for the convocation of a regional conference on peace in the Horn. The strategy adopted by President Gouled during his "exploratory" mission is aimed more at obtaining "low-level" results by confronting concrete problems: convince Mogadishu to temporarily set aside territorial questions and negotiate limited agreements with Ethiopia, such as the reopening of the passage between the two countries and freedom of circulation for the nomad population. Various factors today point to a reconciliation. On the one hand, Ethiopia wishes to achieve peace in order to devote itself to developing its resources. The country aspires at removing the threat from its borders in order to disengage itself from the military sway of the Soviets and the 15,000 Cubans, whose presence is increasingly less well accepted by a fiercely nationalistic population.

#### Burden

Somalia, for its part, does not have the resources to pursue its expansionist ambitions: its population is exhausted, weakened by war, 2 years of drought, shortages and famine. The country is crumbling under the weight of 1.7 million refugees. The 560 million dollars promised in Geneva for African refugees have not been received yet, and the 40 million dollars in military aid promised by Washington in exchange for the Berbera naval base are only being dispensed at eye-dropper speed.

#### Grumbling

According to rumors, Egypt, one of the handful of Somalia's allies in the region, may reconsider its promise to provide military equipment, notably tanks. Following the war between Iraq and Iran, fuel is difficult to find. Moreover, Siad Barre's regime must face a two-pronged opposition: the Somali Salvation Front, supported by Ethiopia, and the National Somali Movement formed in London on 6 April, aimed at overthrowing Barre "by all means available, including arms."

To the dissatisfaction of business circles, which hope for a relaxation of the economy, must be added now the grumbling from one segment of the army: President Barre dismissed 10 members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council at the end of April, including the minister of defense.

Under all these pressures, Gen Barre seemingly has no alternative than to negotiate to break out of an isolation that could prove fatal. Of course, he would have to negotiate with Ethiopia in such a way as not to lose face. The "small steps" policy advocated by President Gouled could provide an honorable "out" for Mogadishu: it is abundantly clear that everyone in the region would benefit from a lessening of tensions to loosen the hold of the superpowers.

#### The Unknown

The great unknown remains the attitude that would be adopted by the Western Somali Liberation Front vis-a-vis an eventual settlement process. The Front has recently evidenced a greater independence vis-a-vis Mogadishu in the face of efforts at conciliation. At its 15 May congress, it came out in favor of the creation of a "free and independent" state of Western Somalia, declaring, moreover, that "all initiatives concerning this region taken without its participation would be illegal."

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BENIN

IMBALANCED, FLOURISHING ECONOMIES COEXIST, FOREIGN AID NEEDED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 pp 1225-1228

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "The Second Session of the Franco-Beninese Committee. Benin: Parallel Economies"]

[Text] The second session of the important Franco-Beninese Committee was held in Cotonou 25-29 March. The talks between Robert Galley and the political heads conducted in this forum were not accompanied by any local histrionics, contrary to what happened during the May 1979 meetings. When Mathieu Kerekou referred on that occasion to Bob Denard's surprise move on the country in 1977, he did so to point out that reconciliation was not the same thing as forgetting the past and that it should at the very least entail guarantees for Benin. The Minister of Cooperation, for his part, was concerned about closing the gap which had arisen in the network of our African friends and wanted, through Benin, to encourage communications between the Republic of Niger and its western partners, by looking into the idea of extending the railroad from Parakou to Dosso and Niamey, among other measures.

The situation has evolved since 1979. Although other countries still all too frequently confuse mercenary activities, supported to one degree or another by some African countries, with the activities of the French special service, President Kerekou did not consider it useful to bring up the problem this time. Moreover, the BCEOM [Central Study Office for Overseas Equipment] is studying the issue of extending the Benin-Niger railway. The Nigerien government's interest in the project has, however, dwindled quite a bit as a result of an improvement in removal and supply conditions by the Togolese line, and next by Algeria, and because of the inevitability of a break in the loading of Arlit ore, whether it occurs in Parakou or in Dosso. The internationalization of uranium sales, 400 tons of which were sold to Libya (if one is to believe the HERALD TRIBUNE), is finally following the same trend. The Nigerien authorities have already made it known that, as far as they are concerned, completion of the Kandadji dam (estimated at 3.5 billion French francs or 175 billion CFA francs) comes before the Niamey railroad on their list of development priorities.

Thus relieved of these extraneous circumstances, the Franco-Beninese dialogue was confined to the usual problems of cooperation: the choice, amount and provenance of investments and the breakdown between grants and loans. The decisions depended solely on available French funds, on the one hand, and on the financial situation, farm and industrial production, and socio-economic structures in Benin, on the other.

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Beninese Socialism

Is Benin a socialist state? Official phraseology and the cordial relations with the East, the USSR and its European satellites, North Korea and Cuba, not to mention the French Communist Party and the CGT [General Confederation of Labor], all leave no room for doubt as to the political direction in which Kerekou is leading his country. The rigid institutions arising from the new constitution are those of a totalitarian marxist state. The school curriculum reforms and the large numbers of students sent on scholarships to Eastern capitals confirm the leaning.

However, it would be just as risky to claim that the socialist ideology meets with the approval of the majority of the people as to detect from their behavior real signs that they are tiring of this ideology. A good number of important people are still under house arrest. Detention camps remain. The regime is not known for its savagery. In a country where the political tradition is to be irreverent of authority, where a critical mind is certainly more highly developed than in other parts of Africa, one might think that adults would still have some nostalgia for freedom of thought, which has almost completely disappeared. This regime's skill lies less in repressing manifestations of this freedom than in drying up its sources through censorship and the requirement that all thoughts be cast in a concrete vocabulary. Generations raised under this system will undoubtedly encounter major difficulties--if they are ever given the opportunity--in thinking and making decisions outside a protective society where political dogmatism is formulated with the certainty of a military regulation.

Farming is heavily politicized through local revolutionary committees responsible for keeping the tension considered useful for production efforts, and through regional action centers for rural development (CARDER), whose wide variety of tasks, ranging from fencing in cropland to stocking and marketing, does not encourage competence. Research has not been neglected.

The idea of grouping together research workers into a national agency, with some French technicians from French institutes assigned as advisers, has proved effective on an experimental basis. But information circulates poorly among complicated, constantly changing structures, and the impact of research on development is diluted accordingly. Having noted these disadvantages, it cannot be said that farming, which is mostly traditional, is socialized. Farmers are merely required to sell certain products, such as palm and cotton, to national monopolies. Collective or government agencies are rare. It will be interesting in this regard to follow the development of the Save sugar complex when the irrigated area which is to supply the raw material is put into cultivation.

Out of a gross domestic product valued at 233 billion CFA francs in 1980, the share of the secondary sector is only 10.7 percent, as against 38.7 percent for the primary sector. Here again there are no truly socialist structures, but public or semi-public companies under close surveillance by the state, which collects for itself more than 50 percent of the profits, without any great concern for reinvestment needs. The main industries are oil mills (SOBEPALH and SONICOG), cement (Benin Cement Company--SCB, and the National Company of Benin Cement Factories--SONACIB), breweries and carbonated beverage plants, textiles (Beninese Textile Company--SOBETEX, and the Beninese Textile Industry--IBETEX), and finally power plants with the SBEE [Benin Water and Electricity Company], which produces only 8 percent of the electricity it distributes while the rest is supplied by the Akosombo hydroelectric power plant in Ghana.



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The secondary sector's share of the GDP is, however, going to increase rather rapidly in the next few years, as some large-scale industrial projects begin operations.

The Onigbolo Cement Company, 49 percent of whose capital is owned by the government, 41 percent by Nigeria and 10 percent by various foreign partners, will have a 500,000 ton capacity which, together with the SCB and SONACIB, can increase Benin's production to more than a million tons. The cost of the plant is estimated at 30 billion CFA francs.

The Save sugar complex was built by the Belgian firm ABR Engineering, in partnership with various French companies participating directly or as subcontractors. It represents a 43 billion CFA franc investment, including an irrigated 5,600 hectare plantation with a dam, road network, railway branch line, drainage system, and miscellaneous buildings, and a factory with an annual production capacity of 40,000 tons of refined sugar. Most of the funds were provided by Belgian credit institutions, under the leadership of the Societe generale de banque [General Banking Company]. The Banque de l'union europeenne [Bank of the European Union] and the Banque francaise du commerce exterieur [French Foreign Trade Bank], for France, contributed 228 million French francs (11.4 billion CFA francs). Finally, two English banks participated in the financing with 55 million pounds sterling.

The Bohicon corn and mixed oil mills in Zou province are much more modest operations. The first produces corn meal, cattle feed and products for brewing beer. The government share amounted to 275 million CFA francs, and the balance was provided by a matching loan from the Fund for Central Economic Cooperation (CCCE), a buyer's credit line opened by France, and bank advances. The oil mill, equipped by the firms Krupp and Koch, will have a processing capacity of 30,000 tons of cottonseed and 24,000 tons of other seeds or nuts (groundnuts or karite). It will supply 5,300 tons of cottonseed oil, 9,600 tons of groundnut or corn germ oil, 9,120 tons of karite nut butter and 20,000 tons of other oilcakes. The Beninese Development Bank provided 350 million CFA francs to help finance this project, and the rest, or about 2 billion CFA francs, was provided by the Federal Republic of Germany.

Aside from these projects, we should mention that drilling operations will soon begin at the small offshore Seme oil field, which Union Oil of California discovered in 1968 and prospected. Handed over by Benin to the Norwegian company Saga Petroleum, with the cooperation of Kwaener Engineering, it has reserves estimated at 5 million tons. The investment of 20 billion CFA francs is at the break-even point for an operation which should not last more than 6 years. The rig will include one main platform, five auxiliary platforms and a 200,000 ton tanker for storage. Norwegian banks financed the venture under the guarantee of the Norwegian Export Institute.

Thus we see that there are only ambiguous economic structures corresponding to the marxist orthodoxy of the political structures. Aside from cash crops, these economic structures leave most of the initiative to the farmers to choose their ventures and market their crops. In the industrial area, they leave the door open to private initiative, whether they operate under the traditional form of stockholding companies or as markets for equipment and project research and development, accompanied by technical assistance and management contracts, the effects of which are more or less the same and sometimes even more advantageous for the foreign contractors, in the end.

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This appears even more in the tertiary sector, exceptionally important for an African country in the tropical zone. This situation is partly the result--and this is its negative side--of an overabundant civil service which several successive regimes have not, despite their efforts, succeeded in trimming down. However, it is also due to intensive commerce which accounts for 23 percent of the GDP, and which ranks commerce second among Beninese resources, after farming. Government corporations have also been created and given a monopoly over certain exports or imports of major consumer goods, either foodstuffs or petroleum products. But consumer subsidies, which these companies are dependent on to maintain the government's pricing policy, make them more like regulatory agencies than true commercial establishments. Most commerce, which does not exclude large foreign companies with offices in Benin as in other neighboring countries, remains in the hands of private interests.

Overall, Beninese socialism, as strict as it seems in official ideology, cannot be considered from an economic standpoint as having reached a point of no return. President Kerekou probably judges faithfulness to a revolutionary platform to be more important than the contents of a system where empiricism preserves its rights. So when Colonel Qadhdhafi announced Kerekou's conversion to Islam following his visit to Tripoli, the Beninese head of state decided it was better not to deny it vehemently, as he did not want to dampen his Libyan host's enthusiasm by expressing an opinion which would, a contrario, have placed Benin in the moderate camp. He merely continues to call himself Mathieu and not Ahmed, and was not converted in any sense of the term.

## Contradictions of an Economy

Commercial traditions in Benin make it poorly predisposed to planning. The deterioration of the statistical apparatus as well as the illicit nature of a good part of the tertiary sector's activities make it impossible to find an explanation for certain phenomena in the government accounts. Has the gradual decline in agricultural and industrial production been offset by an increase in food production? Do smuggling and the unofficial traffic of goods across the border balance out the official trade deficit? Does the increase in the debt reflect fundamental economic disorder or simply budget difficulties? We will have to be content here with a few basic figures, frequently differing from one source to the next, and then, on the basis of these figures, hazard a few estimates.

Benin. Marketed Production of the Main Cash Crops  
(in 1,000 metric tons)

	1975/76	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80
Palm oil	38.5	9.9	9.4	11.9	12
Palmetto	83	83.5	84	-	-
Unseeded cotton	20.5	14	18.7	26.7	15
Groundnuts (in shell)	34.7	61.1	66.5	63.7	70
Karite nuts	7.5	14	14.1	0.4	17
Coffee	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Tobacco	1.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3

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## Cotton Production in Benin

	Area under Cultivation	Production (Tons of cottonseed)
1963-66	-	4,017
1970-71	38,957	35,967
1971-72	54,383	47,252
1972-73	56,170	49,999
1973-74	52,860	44,575
1974-75	48,448	34,500
1975-76	31,667	20,070
1976-77	23,780	17,497
1977-78	20,590	14,032
1978-79	25,994	18,720
1979-80	31,564	26,766
1980-81	24,985	14/15,000 (estimated)

The fall in farm production for industrial use is a fact. The figures on palm products are explained by the 1976 drought and recovery from its disastrous effects will not occur before 1983, in the best of circumstances. But the figures are still far off the mark. In 1975-76, palm oil production amounted to 38,000 tons. After going down to 9,000 tons in 1977-78, it came back up to 12,000 tons in 1979-80. In any case, the drought cannot explain the decline of cotton production to the same degree. We should mention the spectacular growth in this crop from 1962 to 1972 (from 100 to 50,000 tons), thanks to the assistance of the CFDT (French Company for the Development of Textile Fibers) in Borgou and of the SATEC (Technical Aid and Cooperation Company) in Zou. The departure of these two companies marked the beginning of the decline. In 1977, 20,590 hectares under cultivation produced a 14,000 ton crop. Some growth was seen in 1978 and 1979, with 18,720 tons and 26,766 tons. Unfortunately, the 1980 harvest, which equalled the 1977 one in surface area and tonnage, did not confirm the premature hopes that the previous growth had nurtured.

Can this situation be explained by factors other than those related to the weather? First let's look at the complexity of the structures. A government agency, SONAGRI [National Company for Agricultural Production], is responsible for importing and distributing fertilizer and insecticides. It is the CARDER that control the farming and purchase the crop from the producer. They then deliver the cotton, via shipping companies, to SONAGRI's ginning factories. But it is another government company, SONACEB [National Marketing and Export Company of Benin], which markets the fiber. Synchronizing the whole works is tedious. To these technical factors is added a certain apathy toward cotton on the part of the planter; the method of payment by official agencies is considered full of risks, while the decline in food production in Nigeria has generated a flow across the border of exports of manioc, yams and grains (corn and sorghum) on favorable terms, making it possible to escape more or less legal checks, to boot.

This favorable impact of the imperfections of the cotton industry on food production will delight the ecologists. Although you have to be cautious in using figures obtained outside market control, a number of indices do in fact indicate that from

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1975 to 1980, corn production increased by 38 percent, manioc production by 60 percent, yams by 42 percent, and beans, at a lower volume, by 100 percent.

Border traffic goes in the opposite direction for coffee and cocoa, which are often sold under better monetary and tariff conditions in Benin than in Nigeria. Hence the volume of these two products shipped from Cotonou port in 1978 accounted for 25.2 percent, or about 1.4 billion CFA francs, of total Beninese exports. Seventy-five percent of this coffee came from Nigeria, and the rate is 98 percent for cocoa.

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Benin. Food Production (estimates)  
(in 1,000 metric tons)

	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78	1978-79	1979-80
Corn	217	182	242	343	300
Sorghum	52	72	76	62	58
Millet	15	4	5	3	3
Rice (paddy)	13	18	15	9	9
Total (grains)	297	276	338	417	370
Manioc	461	624	625	721	741
Yams	445	590	552	643	632
Beans	22	23	25	39	42

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This traffic considerably changes the trade balance data. On the basis of 1978 customs statistics, the most recent published to date, real exports can be estimated at 10.6 billion CFA francs, instead of the 5.8 billion announced officially. By the same token, real imports would be 72 million instead of 60. The theoretical trade deficit persists, but whether we are referring to illicit import or export transactions or smuggling, the entry values must be increased when the goods leave the country by a sales tax, shipping costs, a service charge, and an exchange profit, all of which is supposed to be reflected in the balance of payments (if it were possible to find these items). If further proof is needed, all you have to do is to observe how carefully all the businessmen or officials in Cotonou follow the fluctuations in the Nigerian naira.

It doesn't take long to realize that there are two economies coexisting in Benin. The first and relatively flourishing one is based on trade relations with the neighboring country, of which it is a mere extension. This is the economy of the middle-class in the south. But the official economy, which covers part of the primary sector and all of the secondary one, inevitably suffers the consequences of a trade imbalance.

The Seme oil field will undoubtedly improve this situation for a few years, as Benin's oil bill amounted to 12 billion CFA francs in 1980, or double the theoretical value of exports. If, however, nonmonetary capital and transfers continue to be unable to offset the deficit in goods and services, the public debt will increase at the same time as the negative balance in the accounts, which have been in disequilibrium since 1977. The debt itself, which was 17 billion CFA francs in 1975,

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went up to 36 billion in 1978 and 84 billion in 1980, for a 33 billion budget. The annual debt service was 1 billion CFA francs in 1977. At 4.2 billion in 1980, its ratio to export receipts, even if corrected as we did earlier, goes over the red line. There is not much chance that the income generated by ongoing projects will be enough to deaden the impact of a debt service that could reach about 21 billion CFA francs by 1985.

Cotonou port traffic, a barometer of the economy, sharply increased in 1979 (1.5 million tons as compared with 775,000 tons in 1975), as a result of the transshipment of Nigerian oil. In 1980, however, due to competition from Lome port, a slowdown of Nigerien uranium ore exports towards the coast, and more generally to a decline in shipments of goods on the Parakou railway line, port traffic dropped. This situation is all the more alarming since the port authorities will be burdened during coming fiscal years by the repayment of loans contracted in 1979 to develop the facilities. This borrowing was done from the CCCE, the World Bank Group, Norway, Canada, the African Development Bank (ADB), and the Arab funds, to the tune of about 226 million French francs (11.3 billion CFA francs).

## The Role of External Aid

Foreign aid and the resulting transfers in the form of grants or loans are the means of restoring financial equilibrium, as we just noted. A lack or simply a slowdown of these funds might force the government to suspend payments.

Fortunately, this aid has not been lacking up to now. It is still substantial, at least as concerns the large international and multilateral development agencies and bilateral aid from the West. Here as elsewhere in Africa, contributions from socialist countries are remarkable only by their modest amounts: a 1.2 billion CFA franc loan from the USSR, study grants, and technical assistants, whose numbers have nothing to do with their efficiency. The People's Republic of China sponsored a 1,000-hectare rice growing project using its own labor and has opened low-interest credits for equipment purchases. North Korea has built several cultural buildings.

Total foreign assistance was estimated at \$93 million for 1979, out of which 28 percent was French aid of all types and 13.5 percent came from the EEC. The Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark and Norway follow, in order of amounts of bilateral aid. As for international or multilateral aid, first is the International Development Association (IDA), followed by the EEC at 5.5 million dollars, UNDP (4.1), the African Development Fund (ADF) (3.6), the World Food Programme (WFP) (3.3), the Arab funds (3.1) and the ADB (1.2). Arab assistance, which has been relatively recent, is clearly on the increase. Algeria has furnished 1.4 billion CFA francs in grant form for rural and industrial development. Libya granted \$10 million, 5 for Porto-Novo hospital and 5 for road construction and sanitation projects, which have already been the subject of international bidding, with several French companies competing.

Thus France maintains its leadership in the area of aid, in keeping with its position as the country's main buyer and supplier. However, while rural development projects received most (43 percent) of the FAC credits between 1975 and 1979, with the irrigation of the Ouidah-Nord palm plantation and the agricultural develop-

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ment of Zou and Borgou, the Franco-Beninese Committee has just confirmed that efforts would, beginning in 1980, be oriented toward projects involving road, port, railway, air and telecommunications infrastructure projects. Forty-seven percent of available loans will from now on go to these projects, which primarily focus on modernizing transportation in the direction of Niger and improving the capacity and facilities of Cotonou port. Loans from the Central Fund, which increased from 1 to 38 million French francs (50 million to 1.9 billion CFA francs) between 1975 and 1980, have been channeled to these projects since 1977, with the exception of a few small housing projects for French cooperative workers and a Fr 20 million (1 billion CFA francs) loan to enlarge the Akakpa electrical power plant.

The same trend for European aid was apparent in Benin after the first Lome Convention, which allocated 20 million units of account out of a total of 40 transportation infrastructure (not including Stabex, food aid and special aid). Generally speaking, aside from humanitarian, social projects, most other aid was also earmarked for this sector.

There is room for regret that assumedly productive investment was, if not abandoned, at least neglected for the sake of expenditures which do not always act as a stimulus to the economy and which in any case entail recurrent costs burdensome to budgets (at least, that is, when someone thinks to include them in the budget). The decline in agro-industrial production, to the extent that it can be attributed to agricultural agencies' shortcomings, does not encourage anyone to work in this area, while the voluntary development of food crops in response to the Nigerian market or for any other reason shows that control is not essential when the farmer is both motivated and free to choose his ventures.

It is also difficult to consider projects when statistical references essential for evaluating their chances are too often missing, and especially when their implementation is scheduled over a period of several years as part of a development plan whose details are unknown. In fact, it is with this in mind that the Franco-Beninese Committee studied the idea of project identification missions to look at this area and to check on the spot the economic functions the project is supposed to be performing. In the meantime, it seems easier to gather information on infrastructure projects, since local authorities do not harbor the same prejudices against the technical studies on which they are based as they do against indiscreet socio-economic surveys, the conclusions of which may run counter to official doctrine. In the final analysis, even if the economic justification for these projects is questionable, they at least have the merit of giving work to public utility companies. Benin may experience a rather tense financial situation. It doesn't mean anything more to these Beninese or foreign companies than a market without problems because it is financed from abroad. Out of these companies, the most active ones are the French firms (Colas, Lecas, Razel freres, Asetom, SIF and Sobeas), with current contracts amounting to about 6.5 billion CFA francs. Other projects in which they will be participating, totalling about 20 billion CFA francs, are at the stage of being advertised or collecting bids.

There are many elements of contradiction and paradox in a country where part of the agriculture and trade is voluntarily and advantageously dependent on the liberal economy of a neighboring country, while the official socialist economy, which owes

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its creation to foreign capital, is barely getting by with poorly adapted structures, to the benefit of public works which are largely unproductive, at least for the country itself. And all of this in the name of an ideology whose rigid facade does not prevent accommodations on the inside. The surprising thing is that, for better or worse, this economy continues to turn, despite increasing financial difficulties. But perhaps these paradoxes are part of normal life in Africa and are more widespread than we think.

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GUINEA

UPS, DOWNS OF PAST TOURE, MITTERRAND RELATIONS SURVEYED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1067, 17 Jun 81 pp 30-31

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Sekou Toure's Bad Luck"]

[Text] A convertible is crossing Conakry, with Sekou Toure at the wheel, Francois Mitterrand at his side. Smiles, greetings to the crowds who are applauding the Guinean president: "Here is Presi! Here is Presi!" And, since the passenger is "Presi's friend," he is also applauded. The French politician is struck by his host's indisputable popularity. Later, he will write: "Sekou Toure...never abused his power, and if one could protest against the expeditious character of his decisions, one cannot find in them the slightest arbitrariness or cruelty."

Again in Conakry, a convertible followed by the applause of a delirious population is crossing the city. At the wheel, for a few minutes, is Sekou Toure, with Valery Giscard d'Estaing at his side. The French politician will later proclaim: "My visit is the visit of reconciliation and friendship, with the forces of the future winning over the forces of the past." Applause.

Love

Seventeen years separate these two scenes. As a special correspondent for the French weekly L'EXPRESS, Mitterrand was in Conakry in December 1961. Belonging to the French opposition, he was therefore received in Guinea as a personal friend of Toure's: 3 years earlier, the latter had closed Guinea's door in the face of Charles de Gaulle. With his trip to Conakry, Giscard d'Estaing, in December 1978, was celebrating the reconciliation of France with Sekou Toure's Guinea. Between the two dates, there is the uncommon story of a passionate lover who loves and hates with the same intensity, the story of Ahmed Sekou Toure, going from friendship to publicly proclaiming his hate toward Francois Mitterrand. A delayed and unexpected consequence: having accepted Giscard d'Estaing's invitation to visit France in June of this year, the Guinean president is now compelled to abandon his plans following the ascent to power of Francois Mitterrand.

Separation

Between Mitterrand and Sekou, the idyl had started under the best auspices in 1950. At age 33, the future French president, at the time minister of overseas France, was successfully attempting to lift the interdiction decreed against



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the RDA [African Democratic Rally] under the leadership of Felix Houphouet-Boigny because of its alliance with the French communists. Sekou Toure was 30 years old at the time and was taking his first steps in the shadow of Houphouet-Boigny, whose most ebullient deputy he would soon become. As a deputy to the French National Assembly, he was a member of the same parliamentary group as Francois Mitterrand who, having persuaded the RDA to break up with the French Communist Party, would succeed in attaching it to his own party, the UDSR (Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance). The UDSR-RDA group would live on to 1958. The ties of friendship formed in Parliament between Mitterrand and Toure, would be strengthened by a common opposition to the spoiler, Gen de Gaulle when the latter came to power in May 1958.

Mitterrand then would begin his crossing of the desert. Toure would follow him when, in September of the same year, Guinea would distinguish itself by opting for immediate independence and rejecting the French community proposed by de Gaulle.

Symbol of African dignity and pride, punished and abandoned by France, the Guinean leader would be even more isolated following his break-up with Houphouet-Boigny, accused of plotting with de Gaulle to overthrow him and bring Guinea back into the French fold. Mitterrand was already advocating a French-Guinean cooperation. At the end of 1961, he would be received in Conakry and would write in L'EXPRESS after his return: "On the side of France, Guinea is up against a wall of intransigence and misunderstanding... I still hear Sekou Toure: 'Why does the French government wish to punish us? Because we chose freedom?'"

Toure would remember this undisguised sympathy. In 1965, having mobilized marabouts and griots, having ordered prayers and sacrifices for Francois Mitterrand, then candidate for president, he would address to him, after his defeat, a cable congratulating him...for having imposed a second election on de Gaulle.

As a member of the opposition, Mitterrand would continue to demand better relations between France and Guinea. However, he would also begin to distance himself from Sekou Toure, obsessed by the idea of permanent plots. Mitterrand could not disregard the fact that, if these plots did materialize (as in Conakry on 22 November 1970), repression was blind (massive arrests, secret and swift executions). On 31 January 1971, he would write in FRANCE-SOIR: "There is no excuse for a parody of justice." And he would add: "Justice cannot be overlooked because of friendship, even if only from past years."

Nevertheless, Sekou Toure would exhibit some good will. In November 1972, in deference to Mitterrand during the latter's visit to Conakry, he would hand over three Frenchmen jailed because of their alleged participation in the November 1970 plot.

#### Break-Up

Two years later, in April 1974, Mitterrand is again a candidate against Giscard d'Estaing. Again, Toure orders prayers and sacrifices, which will not bring victory to Mitterrand. The Guinean leader is now beginning to lose confidence in his friend's luck. He is also eager to renew ties with France because his Soviet relations have not borne fruit. De Gaulle is dead, Pompidou, his successor, has also gone. As the new president, Giscard is not known as an irrevocable Gaullist.

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Reconciliation is therefore possible. Toure then prepared one of the about-faces of which he is a past master. On 14 July 1975, he frees some French prisoners and hands them over, not to Mitterrand--now in the opposition--but to Ambassador Andre Lewin. Contacts open with official France. Simultaneously, the break-up with the French opposition is consummated.

Promise

The hoped-for pretext will be provided through the initiative of an obscure militant of the French Socialist Party--headed by Mitterrand since 1971--of Guinean origin. Encouraged by the increasingly clearer complaints of certain commissions of the Socialist Party as to Sekou Toure's peculiar concept of human rights, this militant, James Soumah, publishes on 2 June 1977 a document in which he proposes to the party's congress (in Nantes on 17 June) to pronounce judgment. This document then denounces arbitrary detention in Guinea.

The Guinean president grabs the opportunity to break with Mitterrand. On 10 June 1977--and therefore before the Nantes congress--he organizes an imposing meeting in Conakry. The order of the day: the trial of the French Socialist Party. It is "total war" against Francois Mitterrand.

One and a half years later, in December 1978, welcoming Giscard d'Estain in Conakry, Toure promises him that Guinea will always support him, even against his enemies in France. He keeps his promise. In April-May 1981, he again orders prayers and sacrifices for Giscard's reelection, with no more success, however, than in 1965 and 1974 for Mitterrand...

Relations with France must now begin again from ground zero. The personalization of official relations has not benefited Guinea. Sekou has sent emissaries to Paris, he has used the good offices of old mutual friends, has promised to make resounding statements in favor of Mitterrand. But he also knows that the latter is resentful, and even "sensitive like a member of the Comedie Francaise," to borrow the phrase of a French politician.

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GUINEA-BISSAU

NOVEMBER COUP REPORTEDLY HAS NOT LESSENE PROBLEMS

London NEW AFRICAN in English Jun 81 p 31

[Article by Colm Foy]

[Excerpts]

IN THE town of Tombali in the south of Guinea-Bissau, the President of the Council of the Revolution Nino Vieira drew attention to "the flight of merchandise and essential goods taken by *djilas* (itinerant traders) across the borders, the high prices in local markets as a consequence of astronomical increases in world prices, and the serious lack of essential goods in the interior". It is a theme he has been forced to expound on often of late.

The situation, which would have been grave anyway, is compounded by the growth of speculation and a thriving blackmarket which relies on cross-border smuggling and corruption of officials for its supplies of goods.

The economic cost to the State was described by Vieira as "enormous" and he has announced that several of the much-criticised, more ambitious projects of the Luis Cabral regime will be run down.

The cost in political terms, too, has been high. Food supplies in the capital, though improved, have not come up to expectations and the smashing of a black market ring often has the opposite of the desired effect since it removes some people's only source of supplies. There have already been rumblings of discontent, including a students' demonstration in Bissau, and Vieira has demonstrated his fear of opposition by re-jailing Raphael Barbosa who was becoming a focus for opposition in Bissau.

Old and New

On the positive side, however, Vieira retains the trust of the army and seems to be gaining international respectability. The return of Vasco Cabral, wounded in the coup by Vieira's men, to the post of Minister of Economic Co-ordination and Planning has been useful in the latter process since he has always been a well-liked and respected figure internationally. Guinea-Bissau is now engaged in actively cultivating links with the UNDP and other international economic and aid organisations in an attempt to shore-up the tottering economy. Vasco Cabral is an old and able hand at this, having performed an identical function under Luis Cabral.

Vieira is not without his own friends either, the staunchest of whom is neighbouring Guinea-Conakry's President Sekou Toure. Toure's initial and rapid welcome to the coup has not been forgotten and a delegation arrived in Bissau earlier this year to sign a mutual economic and social co-operation agreement between the two countries. This in spite of the still unresolved petroleum-border dispute. Toure, too, was instrumental immediately after the coup in softening the effect of shortages by sending quantities of rice and other food to Bissau.

Nino Vieira and his fellow council members will have a very difficult job in the months ahead to retain the popular support which came out on to the streets for them eight months ago.

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MALI

FRESH PARTY PURGES MAY BE IN OFFING

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 May 81 pp 44-45

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "In Promising Change General Moussa Traore Tries To Reorganize the Entire Civilian and Military Political Classes. A New Purge Is Under Way"]

[Text] The first stage of the great shake up affecting the single party will be over within a month. At the end of June, all of UDPM's [Democratic Union of Malian People] local committees will be completely reorganized, according to the decision of the extraordinary congress held in February 1981.

At that time a progressive purge of all other organizations will begin, according to a timetable established by Gen Moussa Traore, president of the republic and secretary general of the party. Between June and September, territorial sections (districts and regions) will reorganize their bureaus and, from September to November, a new team should be installed in the National Council. Very likely, the regular UDPM congress will convene towards mid-November to install a new BEC [Central Executive Bureau].

A major decision is also expected from this congress: The dissolution of the National Assembly which, according to the logic of the reorganization should reflect the newly installed teams at the head of all the party's organizations.

Acting in favor of the president is the notorious unpopularity of BEC members. Several are accused of having instigated the violent repression of student demonstrations a year ago. Moussa Traore also counts on the support of his administrative cadres. A number of them--including regional governors--felt they were being slighted by the oligarchy which took over the party after its inception in March 1978. Even the president wanted to restore the balance between the political and administrative classes. For this purpose he had the February congress adopt two important measures: Since then, ambassadors and regional governors are henceforth de jure members, of the National Council; henceforth, high officials appointed by decree can aspire to elective offices both in the National Assembly and in party organizations.

It remains to be seen if the cadres, courted in this manner, will perform effectively, by canvassing for positions at various levels of the UDPM. If not given the party's preeminence over the government, Moussa Traore will, it is true, again still be president of the republic and secretary general, but

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isolated in the midst of those he could not eliminate. So isolated that he won't be able to count on the last of the loyal officers who, on 10 November 1968 carried out the coup against Modibo Keita and who supported him in 1978 when he decided to restore a constitutional existence in Mali.

Only 4 of the 14 who toppled Modibo Keita were still in power at the start of 1981: Gen Moussa Traore, himself; Cols Amadou Baba Diarra, Filifing Sissoko and Youssouf Traore. The others have disappeared, died, been sent to prison or back to the barracks, the victims of the internal rivalries and settling of accounts which for 10 years were what passed for politics. Then on 7 May 1981 Col Yousouf Traore too left the limelight. But he did so by personally resigning from his position as party information and culture secretary.

This resignation was unexpected from Moussa Traore's constant protege. But it was, logical: The party committee he chaired had been dissolved a week before for having drawn up a report on the school situation which was, moreover, rejected by the executive bureau. According to reliable sources, this report supposedly sanctioned measures deemed too favorable to the student movements (that are outlawed anyhow): The reopening of teaching establishments (the university has not reopened for the 1980-1981 period, now ending); resumption of scholarship grants; amnesty for the students who skipped last year's exams and are now forbidden to enroll in any other school. According to other sources, however, Youssouf Traore and his committee allegedly erred in the direction of "demagogy" by proposing commitments which, the treasury quite obviously could not meet.

Having lost his right arm in a hunting accident, this strict officer, was still Moussa Traore's right hand man. Both a man of action and a man of words, Youssouf Traore acquired a reputation for "piety" thanks to his marabout friends. A former minister of education, he even came forth as someone who could talk with the students, even though his dialogue was often reduced to a litany of promises. So much so that the national education seminar, organized with his help in December 1978, was the distant source of the 1980 student riots. Promises made at that time were never kept. Youssouf Traore was rejected and will henceforth be seen by the students simply as a "person who could talk." On pension following his resignation, he is now back to being a civilian released from his officer's oath: Loyalty to Moussa Traore. But, Youssouf is not alone in wanting to distance himself. Twice, since the beginning of the year, Col Amadou Baba Diarra, deputy secretary general of the party and, consequently the number two man in Mali, has submitted his resignation to Moussa Traore who turned it down. His friends say that he remained more out of loyalty than conviction.

The last comrade from 1968, Col Filifing Sissoko also is supposed to have been eclipsed. As the president's cabinet chief, this taciturn officer has always been like a spider, backstage, spinning and spreading its web around the lead actors. But he also is allegedly strongly challenged within the party's executive bureau.

Adding to this unease surrounding Moussa is a wave of grumbling at the lowest levels. Since December 1980 two conspiracies of nonranking police officers

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have been foiled in time. The first one, rather sordid, was instigated by a first sergeant who had used his participation in an investigative committee on corruption to avoid paying enormous debts. Ordered by Moussa Traore to pay a merchant, the officer simply dreamed up the final solution, that is, a coup. The second conspiracy, discovered in January 1981, was more serious since it implicated the USSR. A Soviet diplomat was caught in the act of delivering weapons to nonranking police officers. He was expelled.

The incident has greatly cooled relations between Bamako and Moscow. It has, above all, heightened the climate of suspicion prevailing in the Mali's capital. In a word up, Moussa Traore has never had to fight on so many fronts at the same time. To realize promised changes he must get rid of the most discredited leaders in his party. Abandoned or, at least, somewhat shunned by his last remaining comrades in arms he hasn't yet succeeded in winning over the civilian cadres he needs.

Shaken by "Soviet betrayal" he is no longer safe from another attempted coup. And this is the moment he has chosen to prepare a constitutional coup: A forced march to reorganization of the entire political class.

He can succeed, provided the party elections still have some sort of meaning in the eyes of the Malians.

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MOZAMBIQUE

MACHEL SENDS PERSONAL ENVOY TO MITTERRAND GOVERNMENT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 9-21 Jun 81 p 29

[Text] Our comrade Aquino de Braganca, personal advisor to President Samora Machel, was dispatched to Paris following President Francois Mitterrand's installation at the Elysee Palace. Aquino de Braganca's numerous friendly ties with French political circles, notably within the left, have already given him the opportunity to hold important meetings both at the level of the Socialist Party and of the Mauroy government, as well as with French trade union leaders. Aquino de Braganca transmitted to his interlocutors the wishes of President Machel, of the FRELIMO Party and of the Mozambican people to strengthen Franco-Mozambican relations. He was also charged with presenting Machel's strategy vis-a-vis the expansionist and aggressive aims of South Africa. "In Maputo," Aquino de Braganca told Lionel Jospin, first secretary of the French Socialist Party, "the hopes of the leaders and the people have considerably increased with the arrival to power of the French left and the positive prospects for a radical change in Paris' policies toward Africa..."

Additionally, Aquino de Braganca had a long meeting with Pierre Mendes France, who confirmed to him that he favored sanctions against Pretoria and that he fully agreed with the ideas developed on the subject by Lionel Jospin during his speech at the opening of the UNESCO conference.

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MOZAMBIQUE

# INCREASING ASSISTANCE FROM ZIMBABWE IN ANTI-MNR FIGHT

London NEW AFRICAN in English Jun 81 p 34

[Text]

THE SOUTH African-backed Mozambican Resistance Movement (MRM) continues to be a major source of concern for President Samora Machel's Government.

The group has stepped up its terrorist attacks on Mozambican installations and on villagers who live in its "operational area", particularly along the Zimbabwean border.

Recently, close to 200 villagers fled into Eastern Zimbabwe from the town of Espangura after it had been attacked.

In the attack, a 2½-year-old girl strapped to her mother's back was shot and died as villagers fled across the border.

The mother was hit in the leg by a bullet and had emergency surgery at Mount Selinda Mission Hospital.

According to the mission doctor, the toddler bled to death after a bullet tore open an artery in her thigh.

Lines Cut

The dissidents were also behind the recent sabotage of power lines from Cabora Bassa Dam, Mozambique's multi-million hydro-power station.

The lines had been cut several times in the past resulting in large repair bills having to be met by Mozambicans.

Laying direct responsibility on the terrorist group and its allies in Pretoria, the Mozambican News Agency (AIM) said in an English language newscast: "These groups operate from bases in South Africa with the support of certain sectors of the Pretoria regime."

Reports from the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border area confirm increased South African involvement in the conflict between the organisation and FRELIMO troops.

According to white farmers in the area, South African helicopters have been spotted just across the border.

The choppers usually come in during the night and seem to be operating freely, mainly due to Mozambique's lack of sufficient air power.

It is also known that Zimbabwe, which has a defence pact with Mozambique, has deployed a crack battalion of its national army to patrol the border.

Military sources confirmed in Zimbabwe that a battalion composed of former troops of the elite Rhodesian Light Infantry and former ZIPRA and ZANLA guerillas who know the terrain well from the days of the Rhodesian liberation war, have been sent there from their base near Umtali.

This is in line with the stand taken by the Zimbabwean leader, Mr Robert Mugabe, who has declared that an attack on Mozambique is an attack on Zimbabwe.

The increasing number of visits to Zimbabwe by top Mozambican military officers suggests increasing co-operation in the border war.

Lt-General Sebastian Mabote, the Mozambican Deputy Minister of Defence, was in Zimbabwe earlier this year. During the visit it was announced by Zimbabwe's military chief, Mr Emmer-son Mnangagwa, that 40 MRM dissidents had been captured by Zimbabwean

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forces.

And during Zimbabwe's Independence celebrations in mid-April, four top Mozambican military chiefs including the Defence Minister, Lt.-General Joaquim Chipande, met in Salisbury for talks with Mnangagwa and members of Zimbabwe's Joint High Command.

The talks centred on the border situation and the 200 refugees who have since returned home.

Meanwhile, Zimbabwe has promoted its wartime guerrilla leaders to the rank of lieutenant-general.

They are Lookout Masuku, commander of Joshua Nkomo's ZIPRA and commander of ZANLA Rex Nhongo. ZANLA is the military wing of Prime Minister Mugabe's ZANU (PF)●

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MOZAMBIQUE

DEFENSE'S GUEBUZA MEETS WITH UK OFFICIALS

PM251417 London THE GUARDIAN in English 25 Jun 81 p 7

[Report by Victoria Brittain: "Mozambique 'on Brink of War'"]

[Text] Mozambique celebrates its sixth anniversary of independence today, having weathered the expulsion of a CIA spy ring, overcome an invasion by South African soldiers aided by [word indistinct] Mozambican officers, and has moved to the brink of "a very serious and dangerous war" with South Africa, according to Armando Guebuza, deputy minister of defence and FRELIMO's political commissar of the armed forces.

Mr Guebuza's job makes him a close monitor of the subversion and sabotage by South Africa which has occurred in Mozambique since the Portuguese left in 1975--FRELIMO cadres beheaded and impaled on stakes, civilian buses mined, power transmission cut, refugees fleeing into neighbouring Zimbabwe.

Mr Guebuza is the archetypal successful African revolutionary--elegant, articulate, well-informed, and too worldly to have high expectations of Western knowledge or interest in the crisis of his country.

His party delegation to Britain this week has been meeting labour, liberal and communist party members as part of a diplomatic effort by African countries to stop Britain being quietly wooed into collusion with President Reagan's southern African policy. "The Reagan administration must choose: to side with South Africa...racist...inhuman, or stay with free, black Africa."

Namibia is the immediate issue. "Since Reagan came, the South Africans feel supported...they have succeeded in delaying a decision in Namibia, and Reagan is aiding them in delaying the decision."

Mr Guebuza meets Mr Richard Luce at the foreign office today. "Mr Luce's statements on Namibia have been correct, important--but does the West really mean what it says?"

Mr Guebuza is also paying a courtesy call on the Defence Ministry. "All our military equipment comes from the Eastern block. The Chinese give assistance with textiles and agriculture only.... The West has never supplied any arms to Mozambique. The West avoids supporting any democratic, really democratic movement."

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Will we be asking for British military assistance? "We are trying to develop cooperation with Western countries." The diplomatic answer seems to indicate that the cooperation will be only diplomatic not material.

Mozambique has declared this to be the decade of war against under-development and has experimented with some returns to private enterprises. Last year FRELIMO appeared to be close to joining the Lome convention, to cooperate with the European Economic Community, but they have now opted for COMECON, the East European economic grouping, according to Mr Guebuza.

Immediately after the South African raid on Maputo in January the Soviet Union sent two warships to Mozambique, the first such visit for a year.

"South Africa is building an army on our borders. They are using the same methods as the Portuguese and the Rhodesians...these armed gangs in our country, the South Africans are commanding them, training them. They give them arms, communications and logistical support."

The largest of the known Mozambique dissident movements is MRM (Mozambique Resistance Movement), previously supported by the white Rhodesian authorities.

Neither the economic nor political sabotage work of armed attacks over the border, have altered Mozambique's moral, material and diplomatic support for the banned South African ANC.

"We do not have military camps in Mozambique, belonging to ANC, as we did openly for Mugabe. It is a different situation."

For how long? "It depends on how the situation in all southern Africa evolves... a lot depends on the West."

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REUNION

ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH MAURITIUS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1554

[Article--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] The first professional meetings between businessmen of Reunion and the Island of Mauritius took place 1-4 April in Mauritius. The talks were organized by the respective chambers of commerce of the two countries and also the Reunion liaison committee on economic affairs. Further meetings were to take place 2 months later on Reunion.

The delegation from Reunion participating in the first meeting was composed of officials in the various economic sectors (transport, tourism, banking, data processing, training, publicity, information, industry, imports, distribution, professional associations...) who were involved in joint deliberations on the following four subjects:

--cooperation in tourism.

--inter-island cooperation (maritime, telex and telephone links, postal links, translations of commercial documents, exchange of information, meteorology).

--exchanges in the services sector (training, insurance, data processing, cultural exchanges, radio and television broadcasting).

--shared information on investment possibilities on each of the islands. With respect to reciprocal investment possibilities, it should be kept in mind that three avenues have been proposed:

--The first is based on the observation that each island taken individually does not have a sufficient market to justify the creation or maintenance of a production unit, that a viable market would require both countries. It is in this context that there has been talk of manufacturing on Mauritius or Reunion to supply needs of the two islands, such as bagasse particle board, grocery sacks, and cement, as well as stamping of bottle-caps and metallic boxes.

--The second way discussed is that of dividing up the stages in the production cycle of a product between the two islands in order to benefit as much as

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possible from the strong points of each island. One could thus imagine that the part of the production cycle that demands heavy investments and consumes a great deal of electric energy, for example, would be carried out on Reunion, where financial investment conditions are favorable and where energy is less costly, while the part of the production cycle that requires a great deal of manpower would be carried out on Mauritius, where the conditions in this area are clearly more advantageous. There was also talk of a textile industry that could have the garments made in Reunion and the cloth milling as well as a furniture industry on Mauritius.

--The third way is creation of new industries where the expansion of existing industries in one or the other of the islands, on the basis of mutual financial participation in specific agreements related to production as well as distribution of products--not only to the two islands themselves, but even to the countries of East Africa. The manufacture of fertilizer on Mauritius and of perfume in Reunion were cited in this connection.

With respect to inter-island communication:

1) On the subject of /maritime links,/ it was decided: to harmonize the priority systems of port utilization in the two islands, and the managers of the respective ports will hold discussions on any investment in port equipment; that there is a need for both ports to have trans-shipment capabilities and for the achievement of a balanced allocation of tonnage of transshipped merchandise in terms of the primary destinations of cargo; to establish, as soon as possible, a body on Reunion similar to the Mauritian Council of Loaders with a view to organizing periodic meetings between the two bodies in an effort to reach a common position in their dialogue with transport help in both aerial and maritime sectors; to harmonize the rate schedules for the services offered by each of the ports.

2) On the subject of /air links,/ it was suggested that freighting charges between Mauritius and Reunion be harmonized and lowered, and that a business affidavit be created for economic operators traveling between the two countries.

3) On the subject of /telecommunications,/ it was decided: to request the application of so-called "slack-hour" rates with invoicing charges reduced by half; to request the Mauritian Government to take the measures needed to improve the internal network on the island.

4) In a more general way, it was suggested that a /Mauritius-Reunion Office of Trade and Development/ be established that could take the form of two branches each headed by a chamber of commerce and industry.

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REUNION

UPCOMING PORT IMPROVEMENTS TO POSSESSION BAY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1554

[Article--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] In a recent "information letter," the Reunion Chamber of Commerce and Industry discusses plans to expand the port at Possession Bay. This follows a meeting last March of the ports and industrial zones management and improvements committee of the consular assembly, a meeting whose aim was to assess the progress made in studies of the financing of the investments for the construction work on the port of Possession Bay.

Possible Sites Examined

We recall that the results of preliminary studies on the port expansion were presented to the plenary assembly of the chamber of commerce at its meeting on 13 June 1980. These early studies had described the problems with the present port and their consequences for the future, and had identified what would be needed in terms of additional studies (trends in vessel size, trends in traffic, projected expectations). The case was made for the necessity of adding two new piers to the port that can receive ships with gross tonnage of 30,000 as a first stage. The various possible sites for building this expansion were studied, and the plenary assembly declared itself unanimously in favor of building an extension in Possession Bay. At the plenary assembly of 16 December 1980, the plan for financing the construction and its anticipated consequences to the port authority budget were the object of a detailed presentation. The measures called for in the financial study to provide for the financing of the investment--specifically a general increase in port fees, and the creation of specific taxes, were approved.

These various measures have been in effect since 15 February.

North-Northwest Orientation: Two Piers Lined Up Side by Side

After a call for bids, the technical and economic studies on the port extension were entrusted to a group made of /The Autonomous Port of Havre and the General Technology and Research Company (PAH-SGTE)/ and the hydraulic studies to the /French Central Hydraulics Laboratory (LCHF)./ The first phase of technical

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studies was presented to the port committee at its meeting on 10 June 1980. Since that time, rough draft studies have been completed. The aim in mind was to refine the decision made about the site in Possession Bay.

With respect to the entry channel, the solution adopted was a north-northwest orientation. As for the internal lay-out of the port, the decision was made to line the two new piers up side by side. This in effect provides great flexibility in utilization and assurance of adequate maneuvering room for the pilots. Also envisioned is a further enlargement of the inner harbor, which would then be 800 x 200 meters instead of the current 490 x 120 meters, thereby providing a stretch of 1800 meters of piers accessible to ships of 50,000 tons.

Beginning of Construction: End of 1981-Early 1982

At this meeting, the members of the committee also took stock of progress on technical hydraulic and environmental studies. It was also confirmed that a series of soundings will be carried out at sea under the pierhead of the dikes following a parallel series of land soundings, the dredging operations, and the survey of shifts in the currents made in the fourth quarter of last year...

Work on expanding the port of Possession Bay should begin in late 1981-early 1982.

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SENEGAL

## BRIEFS

ITALIAN AID PROJECTS--Senegalese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Moustapha Niasse paid an official three-day visit to Italy between 11 and 13 May. He had numerous talks with his Italian counterpart, Emilio Colombo, at whose invitation he made the trip. In the course of his stay, relations between the two countries were strengthened. For example, Italy agreed to grant Senegal a credit balance of 4.5 billion CFA francs and another sum of credit totaling more than 2 billion for fishing. Both parties examined another list of projects, which will be discussed in greater depth during the visit. Senegalese Minister of Planning and Cooperation Louis Alexandrenne will pay to Italy. These projects come to several thousands of billions of CFA francs. In addition, Italy has decided to agree to the most favorable conditions for its participation in the OMVS [Senegal River Development Organization] projects. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1532] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 5157

CHINESE CULTURAL AGREEMENT--Senegalese Minister of State for Culture Assane Seck and Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Dakar Zong Ke Wen signed a cultural agreement on 21 May in accordance with which the two countries will develop the relations already existing between Dakar and Beijing. By this agreement, China and Senegal undertake to promote trade in the realms of art, education and health, and also in the information sector. The countries already have excellent cultural relations, in particular where education is concerned. In fact, for some years, Senegalese students on scholarship from Beijing are pursuing their education in China in various fields. Also in the realm of public health, Chinese technicians have already made their contribution, functioning in the rural zones in particular. Thus in signing a cultural agreement, Dakar and Beijing have simply created the legal framework needed for the consolidation of their relations. In addition, China's contribution in the farm sector is of undeniable importance, particularly where food crops such as rice are concerned and in the water power sector. A number of Chinese projects have already been completed or are being carried out thanks to the China Drilling Mission [Mission Chine-Forages]. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1533] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 5157

BRAZIL OFFERS CREDIT--Senegalese Minister of Planning and Cooperation Louis Alexandrenne paid an official visit to Brazil between 25 and 29 May to study the use of a credit line of \$12 million offered to Senegal by the government in Brasilia. That government reports that the Senegalese are interested in purchasing equipment for the food industry, electrical projects, reforestation and fire control, water power development, hospitals and public works. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1533] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 5157

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28

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ZAMBIA

BRIEFS

AUSTRIA PROVIDES AID--On welcoming Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs Willibald Pahr in Lusaka on 19 May, President Kaunda emphasized that the production of ethanol from sugarcane is vital for a country such as Zambia, whose oil bill is high. He expressed satisfaction with Austria's willingness to cooperate in the establishment of ethanol production units in the country. Also thanks to the visit paid by the Austrian minister to Zambia, a long-term loan of one million kwachas granted by the government in Vienna to Maamba Collieries was made a gift. In addition, Austria has recently aided Zambia in the cattle raising and dairy production sector. It provided 90 head of cattle in 1979 and 130 in 1980. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1547] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 5157

WORLD BANK LOAN--A spokesman for the World Bank announced in May in Lusaka that the officials of that body had approved the granting of a loan of 9.5 million kwachas to Zambia for agricultural projects in the eastern province of the country. This financial aid, over a period of 5.5 years, should make it possible to increase agricultural production there as well as to raise the standard of living of the small farmers, through the provision of technical advice, financial aid and various services, and increasing the farm product storage capacity. It is hoped that annual production of corn can thus be increased by 16,500 tons, that of cotton by 4,000 tons, that of sunflower seeds by 2,300 tons, and that of peanuts by 1,500 tons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1547] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 5157

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